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Argentina has a long history of political instability, financial crises and decline in
relative economic level. At the beginning of the 20
th century, Argentina's economic level,
measured by GDP per capita, was not far behind Europe, Australia or Canada. However,
after a long period of economic mismanagement, Argentina’s relative position in the world
economy has fallen significantly.
The beginning of the last decade of the 20
th century brought a hope that Argentina has
finally turned the corner, and that a period of economic prosperity lies ahead. Successful
stabilization program based on the currency board arrangement (CBA) brought inflation
quickly down, economic growth recovered sharply, and Argentina became a favorite
destination for foreign capital. Yet problems lurked ahead.
First came the Mexican crisis of late 1994. Argentina was hit hard by this so-called
“tequila” crisis, but with the help of the central bank, its relatively strong banking sector
survived the withdrawal of deposits and after one year of sharp decline, the economy grew
again in 1996. But another shock followed in 1997, when a violent financial crisis erupted in
Asia, followed in 1998 by the Russian crisis and in 1999 by crisis in Brazil, which floated its
currency. Argentina has already suffered from turmoil caused by Asian and Russian crises
and devaluation of the Brazilian currency added to its problems. While the authorities
repeatedly assured the investors that currency peg was here to stay (a promise made more
credible by the overwhelming support that the CBA received from the population), persistent
economic recession and deteriorating access to external financing made look Argentina's
economic and financial situation suddenly more worrisome. Large official financial
assistance in 2000 and 2001 was supposed to reassure investors about Argentina's solvency
while taking care of the immediate liquidity problem and thus safeguarding its currency peg.
But this effort was not successful and after desperate attempts to avoid the unavoidable, the
crisis reached a climax by the end of 2001.
Violent social unrest brought down the government of president de la Rua and the
new government was forced to scrap the CBA. The new government has announced that
Argentina is unable to service its $142 billion external debt and has declared a moratorium
                                               
1 Advisor to the Executive Director, International Monetary Fund. The views expressed here
are authors’ own and do not represent the official position of the IMF. Author would like to
thank Isabelle Mateos y Lago for valuable comments on an earlier draft of the paper.- 2 -
on its external debt payment. A country that few years ago was a darling of financial markets
has in a very short period of time became something akin to international pariah, mired in a
deep political, social and economic crisis.
In the latter half of the 1990s, financial crises in emerging market countries have
become a relatively frequent occurrence: first Mexico, then one of the most promising
emerging market country, followed by several countries in Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and
now Argentina. Yet Argentina was supposed to be different. Its banking sector - a frequent
source or contributing factor to crises in other countries - was relatively robust, as evidenced
by its ability to withstand large deposit outflow during the Mexico crisis. And its currency
peg - in the form of the CBA - was supposed to be more resistant to the sort of speculative
attacks that undid softer fixed exchange rate regimes. So what explains the dramatic
implosion of the Argentinean economy, four years of recession ending in a financial collapse,
large increase in unemployment and massive increase in poverty that practically wiped out
all the gains made during the more prosperous years of the 1990s?
This study will try to provide some preliminary answers to these questions. However,
while we will focus mainly on the economic aspects of the crisis and the developments that
preceded it, we need to keep in mind that economics alone will not provide us with a
complete understanding of this crisis. This is not only a financial and economic crisis, but
more profoundly, a crisis of institutions, politics and trust. As we will see, the events of 2001
are not something completely new to Argentina. This country has a quite rich history of
financial crises and debt moratoria. The progress under the CBA in the 1990s may have been
quite spectacular: inflation fell rapidly, and economic growth accelerated sharply. This
contrasted sharply with the poor performance during the 1980s. But the more fundamental
problems of Argentina's economy remained and so too remained the vulnerability to adverse
external shocks. We will analyze how this domestic vulnerability interacted with external
shocks, and how constraint on policy implementation implied by the CBA, together with the
limited efficacy of other policy tools combined to produce a crisis that has devastating and
far-reaching consequences.
We will start with a brief review of Argentina's history, which provides some
important clues to the recent events.
2. Argentina's history: up and down
During the last decade of the 20
th century, Argentina has enjoyed a brief period of
prosperity, followed by serious economic decline and crisis. For Argentina, this is not a new
pattern. The 1990s has provided a snapshot of nearly two hundred years of history of
independent Argentina.
When it gained independence in 1816, Argentina was one of the poorest colonies of
Spain. However, early years of its independence did not provide much reason to celebrate.
This was a time of political and economic instability, which culminated with a civil war in
late 1850s and early 1860s. During that period, Argentina remained a relatively poor and- 3 -
underdeveloped country. Unlike some other countries in Latin America, it did not have rich
deposits of precious metals (not that having one would have automatically ensured a more
prosperous economy, though!), its more moderate climate did not allow it to grow tropical
products like coffee, which was an important export commodity of other countries in the
region. And the geography did not cooperate either: being so distant from main markets in
Europe did not provide much impetus to trade anyway.
Argentina's economic fortune began to change only in the last quarter of the 19
th
century. Two important technological innovations have helped Argentina: improvement in
storage and conservation of agriculture products, mainly meat, and progress in transport
technology. Cheaper transport and better conservation made remote markets in Europe and
North America suddenly accessible to Argentinean exporters.
2 Thanks to a very fertile soil of
pampas, Argentina's export of agriculture products, mainly to European markets, began to
grow fast. A poor and underdeveloped Spanish colony began to turn quickly into a relatively
prosperous country. Success breeds success, and Argentina became an attractive destination
for labor and capital from Europe. Together with Canada, Australia and United States,
Argentina attracted large amount of capital particularly from the United Kingdom, major
capital-exporting country of that time.
3
However, large inflow of foreign capital brought a problem well known to emerging
market countries one hundred years later: financial crisis. Two powerful forces combined to
accelerate capital flow to Argentina and other – at that time “emerging” – countries,
Australia, United States and Canada: investors’ expectations about high returns, and loose
liquidity conditions and low interest rates in countries exporting capital, mainly United
Kingdom. Unfortunately for Argentina, large inflow of foreign capital in the 1880s has
stimulated not only investment, but also consumption. While Argentina’s exports rose as
well, country’s capacity to improve its export earnings on a sustainable basis in order to be
able to service future debt repayment did not improve sufficiently. At the same time, poor
governance of domestic banks resulted in such unhealthy practices as connected bank lending
and bank financing of government deficits and development projects. When monetary
conditions were tightened as Bank of England increased interest rates in second half of 1889,
capital flow to Argentina suddenly stopped and the country had to sharply adjust its current
account balance from a deficit to a surplus, by tightening macroeconomic policy. Excesses of
                                               
2 Progress in transport technology has significantly reduced the cost of transporting bulk
items from South America to Europe, while new cooling technology allowed to transport
perishable commodities across the tropics.
3 While Argentina’s trade integration was spurred by improved storage and transport, its
integration in international capital market has received a boost in 1878 when transatlantic
cable connected it via telegraph with London, facilitating and accelerating dramatically
transmission of information. Joining gold standard has also boosted Argentina’s integration
into world capital market.- 4 -
previous decade and bad lending practices came home to roost. The result was a very serious
economic and financial crisis, known as Baring crisis, named after the well-known English
institution which was nearly brought down because of Argentina’s default on its debt
underwritten by Baring.
 4 But while Baring was saved thanks to a joint effort of Bank of
England and some private financial houses, Argentina did not receive much help and fell into
a deep recession.
5  In 1890, Argentina suspended servicing its external debt, and lost access
to world capital market. Only the reinstation of gold standard in 1899 and resumption of gold
payment in 1901 restored Argentina’s access to external borrowing.
In the period from the beginning of the 20
th century to the beginning of the Great
Depression in 1929, Argentina pursued economic strategy characterized by promotion of free
trade and integration with world capital market. In connection with the outbreak of the First
World War in 1914, Argentina suffered its worst recession. 
6 Despite this traumatic
experience, it returned in the 1920s to the pre-war economic policy of openness.
Like in many other countries around the world, situation in Argentina began to
deteriorate again at the end of the 1920s, as a result of the Great Depression. The global
economic crisis has affected adversely Argentina for two reasons. Weak global economic
activity resulted in less demand for Argentina's exports, and has further weakened already
low world prices of corn and meat, Argentina's two important export items. In response to
these shocks, the government began to change its strategy. It began to introduce
administrative controls, including control on capital outflow, import restrictions to protect
domestic producers, and it quickly abandoned the gold standard and devalued its currency.
7
                                               
4 It should be noted that Baring crisis was not the first default of Argentina. Ironically, it was
Baring Brothers who floated the first public loan, issued by Buenos Aires, in 1824. The
borrower soon defaulted on that loan and only in 1857 was a settlement reached. The 1820s
was one of the first episodes of irrational exuberance of investors. Newly independent
sovereigns in Latin America were raising larger amount of funds which European investors
were eager to provide. It was for the first time, but not the last time when investment in Latin
America went wrong.
5 The analysis of Baring crisis see Ford, A.G. (1956), “Argentina and the Baring Crisis of
1890,”. Oxford Economic Papers 8, pp. 127-150.
6 Measured (as a fraction of annual output) by the cumulative deviation of output from
previous peak until the previous peak is surpassed, the recession of 1914-1919 saw a 63
percent decline; Baring crisis in 1890-93 a 31 percent decline; and Great Depression in 1930-
34 a 43 percent decline. See Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (1998), “Economic
Recovery From the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations and the Change of
Macroeconomic Regime.” NBER Working Paper 6767.
7 Paul Krugman argues that being fast in abandoning gold standard was a wise decision that
allowed Argentina to recover from a crisis faster than other countries, which defended
(continued)- 5 -
But while a timely exit from the gold standard may have been a positive step and while
protective measures could have brought a temporary relief, they were not helpful in the long-
run. The Great Depression marked the beginning of a different economic strategy – strategy
based on import substitution and closing of the economy.
Initially, this policy strategy has brought encouraging results. The economy has
recovered rapidly from the crisis and began to grow strongly after 1932, at the time when
many other countries were still deep in recession. But this recovery was not to last and
instead, Argentina began its long descend on the ladder of relative economic performance
(see table 1).
Table 1. Product per capita in selected countries (in 1985 PPE dollars 1/)
USA Argentina Australia Canada
1870 2244 1039 3143 1330
1890 3101 1515 3949 1846
1913 4846 2370 4553 3515
1950 8605 3112 5970 6112
1973 14093 4972 10369 11835
1989 18282 4080 13538 17236
1/ in purchasing power equivalent
Source: Maddison, A., "Explaining Economic Performance of Nations 1820-1989," in
Baumol, Nelson and Wolff, Eds. (1994), Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National
Studies and Historical Evidence. New York, Oxford University Press.
Administrative measures and restriction on capital outflows became gradually more
complicated, as the authorities attempted to avoid the inevitable erosion of their
effectiveness. At the same time, expanding administrative controls was producing more
corruption. Scarce economic resources were used mainly to circumvent these controls, and
the price was lower economic efficiency and growth. Furthermore, initially temporary
protection of domestic producers was becoming permanent. One can understand, even if not
fully approve, the introduction of administrative controls and increased protectionism in
difficult times of the Great Depression. But these measures were not removed during the
more prosperous times, like during the Second World War, when Argentina benefited from a
surge in demand for its agriculture exports. On the contrary, the war period resulted in further
tightening of administrative controls.
                                                                                                                                                 
currency peg to gold longer. See Paul Krugman (1999), The Return of Depression
Economics. W.W. Norton, p. 46. It is an irony that nearly seventy years later, delayed exit
from pegged exchange rate was considered as having contributed to the seriousness of
Argentina's crisis.- 6 -
In 1946, former minister of labor in military government Juan Peron won presidential
elections. His populist policies have contributed to a further decline of Argentina. Peron
nationalized many enterprises, which were in foreign ownership, further increased the
protection of domestic producers against foreign competition, and expanded the already high
role of state intervention in the economy. Peron also pursued a policy of income
redistribution in favor of workers. The main instrument to achieve this objective was rapid
wage growth. The consequences of this policy were ruinous. Losses of nationalized
enterprises began to mount and fiscal deficits grew rapidly. Having lost access to foreign
financing after the default in the 1930s and being unable to rely much on limited private
domestic savings, the government had no other choice but to resort increasingly to financing
its deficits by printing money. This policy has produced accelerating inflation, without
achieving the purpose of increasing workers’ purchasing power.
During a military putsch in 1955, Juan Peron was removed from the presidential
office. What followed was a period of political instability and several more military
putsches.
8 The legacy of Peronist populist policies was not very helpful to those it was
supposed to help: high inflation was eroding savings and standard of living and
unemployment was high. Once again, Juan Peron became president in 1973, but he died soon
after he returned to the office and his (third) wife took over. She continued in the same
populist and protectionist policy, but this brought only deteriorating economic situation,
further political instability and even rising terrorist attacks. In 1976, military junta has again
seized power. At the end of the 1970s, Argentina was in the middle of economic and
financial crisis: inflation was growing and currency was quickly loosing value. The military
came with a time-honored idea how to mask its inability to address domestic problems:
deflect attention to problems abroad. Therefore, on March 2, 1982, Argentina has invaded
Falkland Islands, which belonged to the United Kingdom. But this diversion strategy did not
work well. After a short war, the army suffered a devastating defeat, which brought an end
(hopefully for ever) to military governments in Argentina.
President Alfonsin took over in December 1983, and he launched an austerity
program, so-called Plan Austral, named after the new currency that was introduced to replace
the old currency. The Plan Austral, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
included orthodox tight fiscal and monetary policy and also less orthodox price and wage
controls, to break inflation inertia. Initially, the plan seem to have worked, and inflation came
down. But it failed to bring under the control large government spending and budget deficits,
which remained at around 5 percent of GDP and which were financed mainly by printing
                                               
8 In the period 1955-82, Argentina had 15 different presidents, 9 of them military. See
Guillermo Escude and Andrew Powell (2001), “The Argentine Fixed Exchange Rate System:
the First 10 Years.” Paper presented on the IMF conference “Exchange Rate Regimes: Hard
Peg or Free Floating? March 19-20, 2001.- 7 -
money.
9 Soon, inflation began to rise again, approaching 400 percent in 1988, and the austral
was loosing its value even faster than its predecessor. Several other stabilization plans
followed, but they were not very credible. Central bank’s foreign reserves were nearly
exhausted in 1989 and the currency was allowed to float.
Argentina was quickly approaching the situation of total collapse of the economy. A
long history of high inflation resulting from monetary financing of public debt brought the
economy closer and closer to hyperinflation. As a result of high inflation, demand for money
was declining. No one wanted to hold the currency, which was rapidly loosing value.
Argentinean economy was becoming demonetized. But demonetization was undermining the
ability of the government to finance budget deficits by printing money. Inflation is a tax on
holding money and as the base for inflation tax (i.e., public holding of money) was declining,
tax rate (i.e., inflation rate) had to increase to ensure the same tax revenues. But higher
inflation further reduced demand for money, which further increases the need of higher tax
rate (inflation) and so on.  In this vicious circle, the economy was rapidly slipping into
hyperinflation. In the period from March 1989 to March 1990, price level has risen by 20 000
percent. Hyperinflation hit the economy hard: in 1989, real GDP declined by more than six
percent. Table 2 illustrates the history of accelerating inflation in Argentina after the Second
World War.
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Source: Domingo Cavallo (1996), Lessons From the Stabilization Process in Argentina, in:
Achieving Price Stability, Symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
                                               
9 During the period 1960-1988, 82.6 percent of consolidated government deficits was
financed by central bank advances. This shows the absolute dominance of monetary policy
by fiscal policy.
10 The value of savings was not eroded only by inflation. In December 1989, the government
converted significant part of austral-denominated deposits into 10 year coupon bonds, Bonex,
which quickly lost about 85 percent of their nominal value.- 8 -
3. Convertibility Plan
The disastrous failure of the Plan Austral affected the outcome of presidential
elections in 1989. The Radical party of incumbent president Alfonsin suffered a defeat, and
the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem became the new president. In his election campaign,
Menem was promising to pursue traditional Peronist policies: he promised higher wages,
support for the poor, and even reopening of some factories that were previously closed
because of large losses. But once in the office, Menem made a complete turnaround. Instead
of the promised populist policies, he decided – with the IMF support - to pursue a program of
radical macroeconomic stabilization, backed by comprehensive structural reforms,
privatization, and opening of the economy. A new austerity program was born, which
represented a complete departure from the policies of the founding father of the Peronist
party, Juan Peron.
The main pillar of the new austerity program was the Convertibility Plan, approved in
April 1991, and the introduction of the CBA. By law, Parliament has introduced a free
convertibility of domestic currency, the peso, into the U.S. dollar at a fixed parity, one to one.
In order to maintain the possibility to convert peso to dollar at the fixed exchange rate and to
maintain confidence in this system, the amount of peso in circulation had to be tightly
controlled. The central bank would be allowed to issue peso only in the amount of its foreign
reserves, so that circulating pesos would be fully backed by dollars or other freely
convertible currencies. As a result of the introduction of the CBA, the central bank lost its
freedom to print money and conduct independent monetary policy.
11 This meant that the
central bank was no more able to finance government deficits by printing money and that the
CBA has removed the single most important source of inflation in Argentina. In order to
support rapid disinflation after the introduction of the CBA, the authorities have also
abolished indexation of wages and other nominal contracts and in wage negotiations with
trade unions, they have emphasized that wage growth should be based not on past inflation
but on productivity growth.
12
The new stabilization program brought soon very encouraging results. Public
spending fell from 36 percent of GDP in 1989 to 30 percent in 1990 and budget deficit fell
from 7.6 percent to 2.3 percent. Even though the authorities undertook a rather extensive
liberalization of previously regulated prices, inflation began to fall rapidly: from 1344
percent in 1990, to 84 percent in 1991 and to 3.9 percent in 1994. Rapid disinflation proved
to be very beneficial for economic activity. After falling by 6 percent in 1989 and stagnating
                                               
11 And more importantly, Argentinean politicians lost the ability to use monetary policy to
pursue political goals.
12 In the period of rapid disinflation, it is particularly important to avoid a backward-looking
indexation of wages, as this could result in significant increase in real wages and loss of
competitiveness.- 9 -
in 1990, real GDP grew by 9 percent in 1991, and in the period 1992-94 continued to grow
by about 7 percent. Return to price stability was also accompanied by a gradual
remonetization of the economy. As we have noted, under the CBA, money supply is
exogenously determined by the balance of payments developments and by the level of
foreign reserves held by a central bank, which have increased from  $4 billion in 1989 to
more than $18 billion at the end of 1994.
The authorities have also reversed the previous strategy of import-substitution, and
rapidly opened the economy to external trade. Average import tariff was cut from 30 percent
to 14 percent and many quantitative restrictions were removed. Many industries that were
able to survive only thanks to these protective barriers had to restructure.
Rapid restoration of price stability and high economic growth made Argentina an
attractive destination for foreign investors. Past periods of financial crises and defaults were
quickly forgotten and foreign capital began to flow into the country, both in the form of
foreign direct investment in connection with extensive privatization of state-owned
companies and in the form of portfolio investment. In the period 1992-1994, net inflow of
foreign capital to Argentina reached $32.2. billion, about 10 percent of 1994 GDP. Unlike in
the previous periods, important part of this inflow was nonbank private capital. At the same
time, improved credibility of the CBA was reflected in the falling spread of Argentina’s
external debt.
But even in the best of times, not everything was well in Argentina: rapid growth and
price stability did not produce a decline in unemployment. On the contrary, in the first half of
the 1990s, the rate of unemployment increased from 7 percent to more than 15 percent. It
seemed as if Argentina was moving alongside the classical negatively-sloped Phillips curve
of the 1950s and 1960s: reduction of inflation was bought at the cost of higher
unemployment.
4. Mexican crisis and rapid recovery
The period of stabilization-induced boom was interrupted by the eruption of crisis in
Mexico. Like Argentina, Mexico too was in the first half of the 1990s a favorite destination
of foreign investors and the country was a recipient of a large inflow of foreign capital.
However, because of its large dependence on external financing, Mexico remained
vulnerable to adverse shocks. One Murphy’s law says that “if something can go wrong; it
will go wrong”, and this is what happened in Mexico in 1994. The country was hit by a series
of political assassination and social unrest in poor south provinces. Moreover, the U.S. Fed
began to increase interest rates in a preemptive strike against inflation. Suddenly, foreign
investors began to have increasing doubts about the health of the Mexican economy. Mexico
began to experience difficulties in maintaining access to foreign financing to cover its large
current account deficit. Mexican peso got under pressure, and in December 1994, the
government was forced to devalue the currency. However, managed devaluation was not
enough and soon the peso was allowed to float freely, loosing rapidly its value. Only large- 10 -
financial assistance from the IMF, United States and other official creditors has allowed
Mexico to avoid the default on its external debt.
But even rapid official financial rescue that helped to avoid the default did not
prevent the Mexican crisis from affecting adversely other countries in Latin America,
including Argentina. After the bad experience with Mexico, investors were looking more
guardedly at other emerging market economies in the region as well. They were particularly
suspicious of countries with similar problems like Mexico, large dependence on external
financing and fixed exchange rate. Based on these criteria, Argentina was an obvious suspect.
In this period, the CBA, which has served the country so well by bringing price stability,
became suddenly a source of vulnerability. After the Mexican crisis broke out and after one
small Argentinean bank with a high exposure to Mexican assets failed, Argentina’s banks
have suddenly found it more difficult to renew credit lines with foreign banks. As a result,
they were forced to call some loans in order to restore their liquidity. Companies that were
asked to repay bank loans earlier did not always have at hand the necessary liquidity either
and this brought them often into difficult situation. 
13 The result was a rapid decline in
investment activity and weaker economic growth. In turn, these problems have affected
adversely the confidence of Argentinean households in banks’ soundness. The depositors
began to worry about the safety of their deposits in banks, large part of which was dollar-
denominated, and many began to withdraw their savings, putting further pressure on already
hard-pressed banks. In the first quarter of 1995, bank deposits declined from $47 billion $41
billion. At the same time, large part of the deposits withdrawn from banks left the country
and Argentina's foreign exchange reserves declined.
Usually, when sound banks face a temporary liquidity need, they receive liquidity
assistance from a central bank. But in Argentina, the central bank was limited in its ability to
provide temporary liquidity support to commercial banks by the rules of the CBA, which did
not allow it to print money not covered by foreign reserves. And unlike in the period before
the Mexican crisis, foreign reserves were not growing in 1995, and therefore the capacity of
the central bank to assist commercial banks was curtailed exactly at the time when it was
most needed. Still, the central bank found some room to help domestic banks. It has reduced
the unremunerated reserve requirement, from 43 percent to 30 percent on demand and
savings deposits, and from 3 percent to 1 percent on time deposits, thus freeing some
liquidity. The central bank has also expanded its rediscount facility. But in the absence of
depositors’ confidence, the result of this support was the decline in the foreign reserve
backing of reserve money. By March 1995, the central bank has lost $5 billion of its foreign
exchange reserves, more than one third of the total, and the backing of reserve money
approached the minimum required limit of 80 percent. The room for further liquidity support
to domestic banking system was exhausted and Argentina turned to the IMF and other
international financial organization for assistance.
                                               
13 For example, when a bank calls the loan earlier than previously agreed, the companies may
have to shut down unfinished investment projects, which could be very costly.- 11 -
The IMF extended by one year a SDR4 billion extended arrangement and the World
Bank has approved loans in excess of $1 billion in support of banking system and social
safety net. The authorities implemented restrictive fiscal measures, equal nearly 3 percent of
GDP on an annualized basis, and set up a deposit insurance scheme. The situation began then
stabilize. In May 1995, Carlos Menem again won presidential election and his victory
brought to an end speculations about the eventual abandonment of the CBA and the fixed
exchange rate parity. Deposit withdrawal stopped, prices of Argentinean stocks and bonds
recovered and confidence in the banking sector was restored. Nevertheless, this temporary
decline in bank deposits and drying up of liquidity contributed to a sharp economic recession.
While in 1994, real GDP grew by 7.4 percent, in 1995, it declined by 4.4 percent.
Unemployment continued to grow, and after several years of decline, the percentage of
households below the poverty line has again increased in 1995, from 13 percent to 17
percent.
14
Banking sector problems that appeared in Argentina as a result of the Mexican crisis
stimulated a discussion about the desirability of continuation of the CBA. But these doubts
did not last long. It was too soon to forget that the CBA has brought price stability to
Argentina and it continued to enjoy a strong popular support. Explicit doubts of some
academicians and implicit market doubts about the future of this currency regime did not
change politicians’ calculation of costs and benefits of maintaining CBA.
After the period of short and steep economic decline in 1995, economic activity
picked up again in 1996, accompanied by renewed inflow of foreign capital.
15 Real GDP in
1996 grew by 5.5 percent and in 1997 even by 8.1 percent. Mexican crisis became soon a
history and the emerging market economies became again an attractive target for foreign
investors. In this period, Argentina was a recipient of large direct foreign investment, but also
of bank credits. In 1996-1998, cumulative surplus on the capital account has reached $44
billion. Under the CBA, rising foreign currency reserves resulted automatically in a more
relaxed monetary conditions, supporting decline in interest rates, credit expansion, higher
investment and economic growth.
In times of ample availability of external financing and rapid accumulation of foreign
reserves, the CBA rules ensured easy monetary conditions that supported economic activity.
                                               
14 Some analysts noted the failure of unemployment to decline in the first half of the 1990s,
and cautioned that the insufficiently developed social security system, combined with the
high and growing unemployment, was likely to lead in the future to social unrest and
pressures to change the course of economic policy of Menem’s government. Later on, these
concerns turned out to be fully justified.
15 The weakening of the U.S. dollar in 1995 helped Argentina’s recovery as well.- 12 -
But in times of dearth of external financing, liquidity conditions could tighten significantly.
Unfortunately for Argentina, such times were drawing near.
5. New Crises and the End of the Game
In mid-1997, financial crisis erupted in Thailand and it soon spread to other countries
in South East Asia. Countries affected by this virulent crisis had to abandon fixed currency
regimes, their newly floated currencies rapidly depreciated, and economic activity fell
sharply. Emerging market economies were quickly losing their appeal to foreign investors,
and the crisis began to spread beyond the South East Asian region. Situation in the world
economy took a turn to worse in summer 1998, when Russia defaulted on part of its external
debt. Later in 1998, situation began to deteriorate in Brazil, and it was becoming clear that
Argentina cannot escape the global turmoil unscathed.
It looks as if at the end of the 1990s, outside forces conspired against Argentina. First,
at the beginning of 1999, under the pressure of financial markets, Brazil had to abandon its
fixed exchange rate regime. The value of the real has plummeted rapidly, from 1.2 reais per
dollar to 2.0 reais per dollar. This represented a significant deterioration of competitiveness
of Argentinean exporters. Second, the loss of competitiveness was further exacerbated as a
result of pegging the Argentinean currency to the dollar that was appreciating strongly in the
second half of the 1990s. Being pegged to the dollar, the peso was appreciating vis-à-vis
other currencies like the euro or the yen. Third, Argentina had to import U.S. monetary
conditions. Clearly, fast-growing U.S. economy in the late 1990s needed a quite different
monetary policy than Argentina struggling with recession. Fourth, Argentina’s terms of trade
were deteriorating, as world commodity prices were falling in line with the weakening global
economic activity.
The erosion of competitiveness, together with the gradual slowdown of capital
inflow, led to a dramatic fall of investment activity and to a recession. In the period 1999-
2000, investment fell by cumulative 20 percent. Real GDP declined in 1999 by 3.5 percent
and by further 0.5 percent in 2000. Unlike in the 1995, this time the recession was not
temporary.
Under the existing policy framework, adjustment to the adverse external shocks was
difficult. Economic recession and decline in private domestic demand did not produce a
significant improvement of external current account balance. And the CBA did not allow
Argentina to adjust to worsening external conditions and availability of external financing by
nominal devaluation.
16  The inability to achieve a real depreciation of peso by means of
                                               
16  Admittedly, the question remains whether in late 1990s, given the highly dollarized
economy, nominal exchange rate flexibility would serve as an effective tool of adjustment to
external shocks, or whether it would become a source of balance sheet’s distress and
financial instability.- 13 -
nominal devaluation necessitated a more gradual and more painful adjustment to external
shocks by means of decline in domestic prices. In 1999, retail prices fell by 1.8 percent and
wholesale prices even more, by 3.8 percent. This decline in domestic prices has contributed
to a limited real depreciation of peso against the dollar, but not necessarily against the other
currencies which were nominally depreciating against the dollar. In real effective terms, the
peso was appreciating: by 12 percent in 1999 alone and by about 20 percent in 1996-1999.
Moreover, falling domestic prices began to increase the real value of domestic debt, which
adversely affected financial situation of debtors.
Worsening external situation and weakening economic activity at the end of the
1990s have affected adversely the financial situation of public budgets. Their financial
situation was further weakened as a result of the half-finished structural fiscal reforms that
failed to fully address some chronical problems vexing Argentina for years, particularly low
tax collection (mainly as a result of high incidence of tax evasion) and failure to improve
financial discipline of provinces. Moreover, Argentina was now starting to pay the price for
high borrowing in the past. Interest payments from public debt began to absorb an increasing
share of government spending: in 2000, interest payments from public debt reached 15
percent of total public spending.
In 1999, presidential election took place and brought the opposition candidate de la
Rua to office. The main economic priority of the new government was to halt the recession
and reduce poverty and unemployment and at the same time to stabilize deteriorating public
finance. The new government has prepared a restrictive 2000 budget, which was supported
financially by a new three-year stand-by arrangement with the IMF in the amount of SDR 5.4
billion (about $7 billion), approved in March 2000.
The IMF program assumed that the government budget deficit would decline from
3.8 percent of GDP in 1999 to 2.3 percent of GDP in 2000. The program also assumed that
the decline in budget deficit would lead to improved confidence of foreign investors,  lower
costs and better access to external private financing.
17 In turn, lower costs and better
availability of external financing were to support investment activity and economic growth,
possibly more than fully neutralizing the negative growth effect of fiscal restriction. Real
GDP was projected to grow by 3.4 percent in 2000.
Unfortunately, the assumption that tighter fiscal policy would result in improved
investors’ confidence did not materialize. In 2000, the situation continued to be difficult for
emerging market economies. Many investors were still licking wounds from the Asian and
Russian crises and in the meantime, hi-tech share bubble began to burst. Risk aversion of
investors remained high and emerging markets’ access to international capital markets
continued to be difficult. This unfavorable external situation was further worsened by
                                               
17 The authorities initially did not intend to actually draw the IMF money and treated the
arrangement as precautionary.- 14 -
Argentina’s domestic problems. As a result, expected resumption of growth in 2000 failed to
materialize. On the occasion of the first review of the stand-by arrangement in September
2000, the IMF has reduced growth projection for 2000 to from 3.4 percent to 2.2 percent, but
it still expected that growth would accelerate to 4.2 percent in 2001.
18 The authorities
therefore continued to treat the arrangement as precautionary.
Argentina was in a Catch 22 situation. To restore economic growth, Argentina needed
to renew its access to private foreign financing. But in turn, to be willing to invest in
Argentina, foreign investors required evidence that the economy is recovering  They were
hesitant to put their money to a country in the middle of economic recession. But Argentina
did not have any economic policy tool at its disposal that would allow it to jump-start
economic growth. Given the fixed exchange rate parity within the CBA, Argentina could not
resort to devaluation of its currency. Neither did the CBA allow the authorities to pursue a
more expansionary monetary policy, as the amount of liquidity in the economy was closely
tied to the volume of foreign currency reserves, which were falling in the course of 2000.
Little help could come from fiscal policy as well. Room for expansionary fiscal policy was
very limited. The only hope for Argentina was that the IMF financial assistance would help
to get it out of this impasse, by providing the initial growth and confidence impulse, that it
would play the standard catalytical role. And so everyone – Argentina, IMF and foreign
investors - was waiting for signs of growth.
But external situation did not improve, and despite the generous IMF financial
assistance,  growth did not resume. In contrast to expectations, international investors
became increasingly nervous about Argentina. Argentina’s borrowing costs were rising and
access of both public and private borrowers to international markets was gradually
deteriorating. Domestic political tensions within the governing coalition did not help either.
From September to November 2000, spread on Argentina’s debt widened by over 300 basis
points, to about 850 points over the U.S. Treasuries’ yield. In December 2002, as Argentina’s
access to international market did not improve, the authorities decided that they will stop
treating the IMF loan as precautionary and draw SDR 1.59 billion. In early 2001, the stand-
by arrangement was augmented by SDR 5.2 billion, to SDR 10.6 billion.
19
The main objective of the augmented arrangement for 2001 was again to reduce the
budget deficit. The new program also contained a number of structural reforms that were
                                               
18  In the end, instead of growing by 3.4 percent as initially expected, the economy declined
by 0.5 percent in 2000.
19 After the approval of the augmentation, Argentina was able to draw immediately additional
SDR 2.25 billion. One fifth of the augmentation was provided under the Supplemental
Reserve Facility (SRF), which carries higher interest rates (surcharge up to 300 basis point
above the basic rate) and shorter maturities. Out of the total drawing of SDR 2.25 billion in
January 2001, SDR 1.48 billion was under the SRF.- 15 -
supposed to increase the competitiveness of the Argentinean economy. Even though the
economy was still in the recession early in 2001 when the new program was formulated, it
again contained measures to improve fiscal balance. However, the objective was now more
modest: to reduce the government budget deficit to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2001 from 3.6
percent of GDP in 2000 (which was well in excess of the originally programmed 2.3 percent
deficit). But even this reduced adjustment implied a restrictive fiscal policy stance, as the
primary balance of the public sector (overall balance excluding interest payments to service
public debt) was supposed to improve from a deficit 0.8 percent of GDP to a surplus 0.4
percent of GDP (original program assumed a primary fiscal surplus 1.5 percent of GDP in
2000).
20
Following the approval of the augmented loan, market confidence began initially to
improve and spreads on Argentina’s bonds narrowed to about 700 basis points. It was still
expected that Argentina will regain access to international markets later in 2001, as growth
resumes and international investors’ confidence in emerging markets and in Argentina
improves. At the beginning of  2001, the IMF was projecting that real GDP growth in 2001
will reach 2.5 percent. But the IMF also recognized that the recovery of investors’ confidence
depends on many factors, including improvement of external conditions, full and rapid
implementation of the agreed policies, and perhaps most importantly, full broad political and
social support of these policies in Argentina. The authorities remained firmly committed to
the maintenance of the convertibility regime and given the expectation that growth will
resume, this commitment appeared credible. But the respite was very brief and the situation
worsened seriously in March 2001. Evidence of continued deterioration in the fiscal
performance fueled political disagreements and domestic political turmoil ended only after
the appointment of Domingo Cavallo as Minister of Economy. International investors’
confidence fell rapidly and by the end of April, spreads on Argentine bonds exceeded 1000
points. Minister Cavallo put together a new policy package and in May, the IMF completed a
third review under the arrangement, allowing Argentina to draw another SDR 976 million.
In the last ditch effort to help Argentinean exporters and stimulate growth, the
authorities launched in June 2001 the so-called competitiveness plan, a package of somewhat
unorthodox policy measures. The competitiveness plan represented a de facto introduction of
multiple exchange rate system: exports except oil were supposed to take place with a
devalued peso (exporters received a subsidy), while imports  were supposed to take place at a
revalued peso (additional tariffs were imposed on imports). The purpose was to simulate the
devaluation of the currency, stimulate exports, reduce imports, and thus improve trade
balance and reduce the dependence on external financing.  One week later, the authorities put
                                               
20 The policy of fiscal restriction was subsequently criticized as a mistake. See Joseph Stiglitz
(2002), “Argentina Shortchanged”. The Washington Post, May 12, p. B1. However, such
criticism overlooks that in the crisis situation, the question is not how large fiscal deficit
should be allowed, but how large fiscal deficit could be financed without resorting to printing
money and triggering hyperinflation.- 16 -
into effect a law which changed the peso's anchor from the dollar to a basket of currencies,
50 percent dollars and 50 percent euros - to be introduced after the euro would reach the
parity with the dollar, so as to avoid an outright devaluation of the peso. But these measures
brought little if any improvement in trade balance. Instead, they made tax system more
complicated and further eroded the already weak confidence in the convertibility and the
CBA. Even exceptional emergency powers granted by Congress to the government to change
tax policy and reform public sector by decrees did not stop the deterioration of public
finance. Falling confidence in the sustainability of the CBA resulted in accelerated bank
deposit outflow and falling foreign exchange reserves of the central bank.
21
To further improve short-term fiscal situation and reduce the need to borrow,
Argentina has undertaken in early June a market-based debt exchange operation. Debt
instruments maturing in the period 2001-2005 were replaced with debt instruments with
longer maturity, maturing after year 2006. While this operation has reduced debt service
obligations in the period 2001-2005, by about US$ 12 billion, this was achieved at a cost of
much higher debt payments after the 2006, by some US$ 66 billion, because Argentina had
to offer high yields to entice investors to accept debt with longer repayments.
Obviously, the longer the economic recession lasted, the longer were the costs, both
economical and political, of maintaining the fixed parity and the CBA. The authorities were
resorting to ever more creative measures to avoid the constraints of the CBA and stimulate
economic activity. However, the result was increasing doubts about the ability of the
government to maintain this regime. Neither large official financial assistance, nor measures
to stimulate exports and reduce imports helped to restore investors’ confidence and economic
growth. Investors’ doubts about the maintenance of the CBA were rising, and so were rising
the doubts about the ability of Argentina to continue servicing its external debt. Price of
Argentina’s external debt on secondary market was falling, and the risk premium was rising.
In mid-2001, Argentina has definitely lost access to international capital market. The
loss of access to external financing posed a difficult challenge for Argentina. After all, this
was a country that used to borrow heavily. Therefore, the authorities had to resort to drastic
measures: to reduce their borrowing needs to available supply of lending – to zero. The
Government has approved a “zero deficit” law which stipulated that for the rest of 2001, the
budget should be balanced. In the second half of 2001, budget spending was to be limited to
the amount of available revenues. The main instrument to achieve the zero deficit was a
drastic across-the-board cut in government spending. For example, public sector employees’
wages and pensions were to be cut by 13 percent.
22
                                               
21 Investors’ confidence was also weakened by the forced resignation of Pedro Pou, well-
respected governor of the central bank, who opposed the competitiveness plan because it was
weakening the CBA.
22 This was a long overdue catch up with the conditions of falling nominal wages in the
private sector.- 17 -
The government still hoped that the zero deficit law and drastic budget cuts would
finally persuade foreign investors that Argentina was ready to make whatever measures were
needed to maintain the solvency of its public sector.  In recognition of this effort, the IMF
had approved by the end of August yet another augmentation of financial assistance to
Argentina, in a last-ditch effort to convince investors that the country was facing a liquidity
crisis and not a solvency crisis. The original SDR 5.4 billion program was now augmented to
nearly SDR17 billion, in part to support the voluntary debt restructuring scheme with foreign
creditors. But even this generous financial assistance did not help. In September 2001, price
of Argentina’s debt on secondary market was again falling rapidly, signaling rising market
expectations of default and/or the expectation that the exchange rate parity would be
abandoned. Nevertheless, Argentinean government still refused even to contemplate such
possibility, and it was resorting to more and more desperate measures with the objective to
meet its zero deficit target. To further reduce its debt servicing costs, it used the moral
pressure to persuade domestic holders of public debt, mainly banks and public pension funds,
to accept lower yields. But as economic activity continued to weaken, budget revenues were
falling even faster than budget spending.
Early in December 2001, the IMF has finally concluded that Argentina will not be
able to reach its zero deficit target and that the current economic strategy does not ensure the
restoration of economic growth and stability in the future. As a result, the IMF did not
complete a scheduled review under the arrangement and did not release the scheduled SDR
1.3 billion disbursement. The crisis in Argentina was approaching its climax. Soon after the
decision not to complete the review, the withdrawal of bank deposits accelerated. The
authorities attempted to stop this drain of bank deposits and foreign reserves, but this effort
was not successful.
23 Depositors were less concerned about the financial health of banks, and
more concerned about the possible freezing or confiscation of their savings by government.
24
Of course, run on banks has forced the government to introduce exactly these measures.
Banks were temporary closed, deposits were frozen and administrative measures put in place
to prevent capital leaving the country. The population that has already endured nearly four
years of economic crisis and significant wage cuts was not ready to take more. Freezing of
deposits triggered violent social unrest which brought down the government of president de
la Rua. A period of social and political instability followed, which saw four new president in
the office in two weeks. At the end of 2001, the government has announced a debt
moratorium and in early 2002, it has abolished the Convertibility Law. After more than ten
years, the CBA that has guaranteed the convertibility of dollar and peso at a fixed ratio one to
one was gone.
                                               
23 It is estimated that in 2001, total deposit outflow has reached $20 billion, about one fourth
of bank deposits. On one single day before the introduction of deposits freeze, this outflow
reached $1 billion. Gross foreign reserves declined from $34 billion to $15 billion and the
share of dollar bank deposits in total deposits rose from 67.5 to 71.5 percent.
24 The memory of a similar confiscation in 1989 was still fresh.- 18 -
6. The causes of the crisis in Argentina
The Argentinean crisis is a complicated economic, political and social phenomenon.
To fully understand and explain the causes of the crisis in 2001, it would be necessary to
analyze in depth not only economic development, but also social and political developments
which have affected the implementation of economic policy and policy choices that were
made at different moments. Political and social developments, institutions and constraints
have influenced the response of economic policy to both external and domestic shocks. They
have shaped the distribution of benefits from a rapid growth, as well as the distribution of
costs of adjustment in times of crises and low growth. Having in mind that this is just part of
the whole picture, we will focus our discussion on economic aspects of the crisis and its
causes. We will discuss four issues: low domestic savings, fiscal policy, currency regime and
structural reforms.
6.a. Low domestic savings
Perhaps the most important underlying cause of Argentinean crisis is the chronical
low domestic savings – a phenomenon typical for most countries in Latin America.
25 Low
level of domestic savings meant that Argentina needed to rely on external savings to finance
part of domestic investment. Argentina’s dependence on external savings during the 1990s is
illustrated in table 3.
In comparison with other countries at similar stage of economic development,
domestic savings in Argentina are relatively low. For example, in countries of South East
Asia, domestic savings are exceeding 30 percent of GDP. Similarly, in emerging market
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, domestic savings are around one fourth of the GDP.
Arguably, the history of high inflation and repeated banking crises, confiscation of deposits
and erosion of their value are among the factors that have contributed to low domestic
savings in Argentina.
26 Perhaps more puzzling is why the period of low inflation and
relatively high growth in the 1990s coincided with further decline in domestic savings. One
possible reason could be improved households' expectation about the future economic
prospects and consumption smoothing. As people expected better economic future and
increased future income, they “borrowed” part of higher future income to finance higher
consumption today.
                                               
25 See International Monetary Fund (2002), World Economic Outlook, May 2002, chapter 2.
26 Argentina’s domestic savings were not always that low. At the end of the 1970s, domestic
savings exceeded 30 percent of GDP, but continued to fall since then. See Alan M. Taylor
(1997), “Argentina and the World Capital Market: Saving, Investment and International
Capital Mobility in the Twentieth Century.” NBER Working Paper 6302.- 19 -
Table 3. Savings, investment (in percent of GDP) and growth
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Domestic savings 17.1 18.6 19.7 16.2 15.9 15.5 13.9 13.5
External savings 4.1 4.8 0.9 2.7 4.7 5.6 5.1 4.1
Domestic investment 21.2 23.4 20.6 18.9 20.6 21.1 19.0 17.6
Real GDP 6.0 7.1 -4.4 5.5 8.1 3.9 -3.4 -0.5
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Argentina Country Reports, 1996 and 2001.
Long-term large reliance on external savings could pose serious risks to the economy.
First, the willingness of foreign investors to invest their savings in Argentina depends on
relative attractiveness of Argentina as an investment destination. And the relative
attractiveness depends not only on what happens in Argentina, but also on developments in
other countries. In countries that are very dependent on external savings, economic growth
could be subject to sudden large swings that are difficult to predict and that may be difficult
to deal with. This is obvious from table 3. The ability of Argentina to attract external savings
was an important determinant both of domestic investment and economic growth. In times of
adverse external situation when investors were less forthcoming and capital flows to
Argentina fell, economic activity weakened rapidly. On the contrary, acceleration of capital
inflow resulted quickly in a resumption of economic growth.
Second, long-term reliance on external savings also results in rising external debt. If a
country uses external savings in the form of debt-creating capital inflows, its external debt
increases directly. Inflow of direct foreign investment does not result directly in an increase
of the stock of external debt, but it has implication for balance of payments and external
vulnerability as well, because it could increase future profit transfers abroad. As we see in
table 4, Argentina’s external debt was rising rapidly in the 1990s.
Table 4. Balance of payments and external debt (in $ bil)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Current account -7.0 -9.3 -2.4 -6.5 -12.0 -14.6 -12.3 -8.9
Capital account 11.5 9.9 2.3 12.0 16.6 17.2 13.9 9.0
External debt 70.6 77.4 99.0 112.0 130.8 141.5 147.9 150.4
In which: public 52.0 5.7 55.8 63.0 67.6 77.2 84.6 91.4
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Argentina Country Reports, 1996 and 2001
In theory, emerging market countries should be net users of external savings, and
should thus have current account deficits for a sustained period of time. Relatively low
capital to labor ratio compared to developed economies should provide opportunities for
profitable investment and higher returns. But for two specific reasons, such reliance was
problematic to  Argentina. First, as a result of the CBA, Argentina was unable to adjust- 20 -
relative prices in response to a temporary shortfall of foreign financing by changing nominal
exchange rate. And second, relatively closed character of the economy implied that
adjustment to a shortfall of external financing through changed quantities of exports and
imports was relatively ineffective as well. Adjusting to a shortfall of external savings
produced economic recession, which only further worsened the access to international capital
market.
Moreover, the long-term reliance on external financing and rapid growth of external
debt  were not accompanied by similarly rapid increase in competitiveness and exports
growth that would allow to service the growing external debt. The economy did not become
more open.
Table 5. External debt and debt service, 1998 1/
Debt/GDP Debt/exports 2/ Debt service/exports 2/
Argentina 52 406 58.2
Brazil 29 340 74.1
Mexico 41 111 20.8
Indonesia 169 252 33.0
Thailand 76 123 19.2
Korea 43 84 12.9
Czech Republic 45 71 15.2
Hungary 63 107 27.3
Russia 62 186 12.1
Source: The World Bank (2000), World Development Indicators
1/ Present value of debt        2/ exports of goods and services
Argentina’s small openness to trade became a major weakness. As a share of GDP,
Argentina’s external debt at the end of the 1990s did not reach excessively high level (see
table 5). In 1999, it exceeded 50 percent of GDP, which is high, but not excessively high.
Such level of debt would not automatically trigger worries that debtor country would be
unable to service its debt and that it would impose a debt moratorium.
27 But the debt to GDP
ratio is not very informative about the country’s capacity to service its external debt, which
depends on the country’s ability to earn foreign currencies. While Argentina’s external debt
continued to increase, its ability to increase foreign currency revenues from exports of goods
and services was lagging behind. The result was that the ratio of external debt to export
revenues, and the ratio of external debt service (payments of interest and maturing principal)
to export revenues were increasing rapidly, as shown in table 6.
                                               
27 Of course, external debt to GDP ratio is sensitive to exchange rate changes. After the peso
depreciated significantly against the dollar, Argentina’s external debt to GDP ratio shot up
and is now well over 100 percent.- 21 -
Table 6. External debt and debt service in Argentina (in percent of exports) 1/
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Debt/GDP 27.7 27.8 39.2 42.0 45.7 48.6 53.7 52.7
Debt/exports 395.4 368 336.2 338.6 358.7 379 435.7 487.9
Debt service/exports 36.8 31.8 30.4 39.5 50.2 57.5 75.8 93.5
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Argentina Country Reports, 1996 and 2001; for
2000 IMF data
1/ Data in table 6 for Argentina are not directly comparable with data on Argentina in table 5,
because table 5 uses a present value of external debt, while table 6 uses a nominal value.
When looking at these data, it is not surprising that at the end of the 1990s, foreign
investors were becoming jittery, began to have doubts about Argentina’s solvency and were
becoming more hesitant to provide new credits. A country whose external debt service
consumes practically all revenues from exports of goods and services needs to borrow to be
able to pay for imports, including imports of consumption goods. But using external
borrowing to finance imports of consumption goods is not sustainable.
In sum, during the 1990s, low domestic savings pushed Argentina to become more
dependent on external savings. The economy became very open to capital flows, but at the
same time remained relatively closed in terms of trade flows. Argentina’s exports remained
below 10 percent of GDP. The interaction of Argentina’s large openness to capital flows,
combined with the relatively small openness in terms of trade flows, has created a dangerous
and unstable situation that has resulted in a rapid increase in Argentina’s external
vulnerability, loss of market confidence and loss of access to external financing.
6.b.  The Role of Fiscal policy
While low domestic savings seem to be the most important structural weakness of
Argentina that has contributed to the crisis, insufficiently disciplined fiscal policy has been
identified as one of the most important policy failures that ultimately undid the CBA.
28 There
is no doubt that maintaining fiscal discipline is an important condition for a successful
operation of the CBA. We have observed that the introduction of the CBA in March 1991
brought a significant improvement in financial position of the public sector. Budget deficit
was reduced sharply and public spending as a share of GDP fell rapidly. In a sense, this
adjustment was inevitable because the CBA has imposed a harder budget constraint on the
government, by preventing a monetary financing of government deficits. But this constraint
                                               
28 See M. Mussa (2002), “Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy.” Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C., which could be found at
http://www.iie.com/papers/mussa0302-1.htm . However, there are also dissenting views. For
example, see Joseph Stiglitz (2002).- 22 -
was not waterproof and more importantly, it began to loosen over time. As Argentina’s
stabilization program produced a rapid improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals,
country’s credibility in international capital market improved and so did its access to
international borrowing. There was no dramatic weakening of fiscal discipline in the course
of the 1990s, but from table 7 which shows the budget balances at different levels of
government, we can see a gradual drift of fiscal policy, as budget deficits returned and began
to creep up.
Table 7. Public sector balance (in percent of GDP) 1/
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Consolidated -3.2 -0.5 -0.8 -2.3 -2.3 -3.2 -2.1 -2.1 -4.2 -3.6
Federal gov. -2.5 -0.2 0.9 -0.5 -0.9 -2.5 -1.6 -1.3 -2.5 -2.4
Provincial gov. -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 -0.9 -1.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -1.6 -1.1
Source: IMF
1/ Federal and provincial balance does not always add up to the consolidated balance, for
example, because of the capitalized interest that is included in the consolidated balance.
There were several reasons for this deterioration, and not all were necessary reflecting
fully a weakening fiscal discipline. First, pension reform launched in early 1990s that was
supposed to resolve the structural social security deficit had negative effect on fiscal balance:
significant loss of fiscal revenues as contributors switched to the private system was not
replaced by expected reduction in tax evasion. Escude and Powell (2001) estimate that this
reform has worsened fiscal balance annually by about 1 percent of GDP. Second, as lower
interest payments on the formerly restructured debt and on Brady debt were gradually
replaced by higher market-based interest rates, interest rate service began to increase (see
table 8) . Third, on spending side, mandatory spending continued to represent a significant
portion of total expenditures, providing the authorities little room for maneuver without
legislative action.
Table 8. Federal government finance (in percent of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Revenue 15.4 17.0 17.9 17.3 17.1 15.9 18.5 19.0 19.7 19.6
Noninterest
expenditure
15.3 15.8 15.9 16.6 16.6 16.5 18.1 18.0 19.0 18.6
Interest
expenditure
2.6 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.4
Source: IMF- 23 -
 Financial discipline imposed initially by the CBA was weakened by the improved
access to private external financing, which became easy available in times of ample global
liquidity. As a result of increased borrowing, total debt of the public sector has doubled
between 1993 and 2000, from $77.6 billion to $145 billion (which represents an increase by
20 percentage points in terms of GDP, from 30 to 50 percent). Domestic banks were an
important holder of public debt, but as Argentina became a darling of international investors,
large and growing part of public debt was sold to nonresidents. Public external debt has
increased from $47 billion in 1991 to $56 billion in 1995 and to $91.4 billion in 2000. The
share of external public debt in total public debt has increased from 56 percent in 1995 to 63
percent in 2000.
Fiscal discipline on provincial level has remained week as well, though for a different
reason. As table 9 shows, important source of provincial government revenues were transfers
from federal government. These transfers took place under a predetermined formula that
provided little incentive to local governments to economize on spending or to increase their
own revenues. A minimum amount of transfers to provinces was guaranteed regardless of the
state of the economy, and regardless the volume of revenues collected by the central
government. As a result, in times of recession and low revenues, this system resulted in a
significant financial squeeze of central government, which had to continue transferring the
prescribed amount of resources to provinces even as its own revenue situation deteriorated.
The whole system provided insufficient incentive for fiscal discipline of provincial
governments, discipline that was required to ensure a smooth operation of the CBA.
Table 9.  Provincial government finance (in percent of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Revenue 8.2 9.7 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3 10.7 10.9 11.2 11.3
of which federal
transfers
5.1 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.3
Noninterest
expenditure
8.8 9.7 10.3 10.3 11.2 10.7 10.8 11.3 12.3 11.8
Source: IMF
In sum, while the CBA has cut off the government from monetary financing of
budget deficits, it also helped to establish price stability and improved investors‘ confidence,
thereby gradually opening access to alternative source of financing – borrowing on
international capital market. As a result, public debt was growing rapidly. 
29 The CBA did
not produce a lasting and sufficiently strong pressure to improve public sector finance to such
extent that the country would become less dependent on external financing and thus less
                                               
29 It should be noted that increase in public debt during the 1990s did not reflect only
cumulative effect of fiscal deficits, but also recognition of previous government liabilities.- 24 -
vulnerable to adverse external shocks. The lack of fiscal discipline has gradually undermined
the credibility of the CBA in Argentina. There is certain paradox in what has happened.
While the CBA, by helping to establish rapidly price stability and growth, allowed Argentina
to borrow abroad, it did not improve Argentina’s credibility to such an extent that Argentina
would be able to borrow long-term in domestic currency. As the former central bank
governor Pedro Pou complained in 1999, before the crisis escalated, despite playing by the
rules of the currency board for nine years, Argentina was unable to borrow from international
investors in domestic currency except in short-term.
30
The combination of limited ability to borrow long-term in its own currency, and the
large access to borrowing in foreign currencies, has contributed to the development of two
potentially serious vulnerabilities in the economy. First, Argentina became vulnerable to a
liquidity shock, as borrowing in domestic currency and partly in foreign currency was short-
term and needed to be frequently rolled over. Reliance on short-term borrowing  could create
a liquidity squeeze if international investors are not willing to provide new loans as the old
loans became due. Second, Argentina’s economy became vulnerable to exchange rate
changes as a result of currency mismatches. Domestic borrowers have tried to avoid the
liquidity vulnerability by contracting longer-term loans in foreign currency, but in the
process, they have become exposed to currency risks should the domestic currency
depreciate. This currency mismatch has become a very serious problem in Argentina and has
complicated the solution of the crisis.
Table 10. Public debt (in $ bil and % of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
$ bil 64.7 68.8 77.6 90.3 101.5 114.4 111.6 123.5 133.9 144.8
% GDP 35.8 30.3 30.1 32.1 36.3 38.5 38.1 41.3 47.3 50.8
Source: IMF
6.c. Crisis and the CBA
Given the prominent role that the CBA has played in Argentina in the 1990s, it is not
surprising that this policy regime has been often mentioned as one of the factors that have
contributed to the crisis. All major financial crises of the 1990s were connected with fixed
exchange rate regimes and countries that suffered these crises had to abandon exchange rate
pegs and introduce more flexible exchange rate regimes.
31 At the end of the 1990s, it became
                                               
30 See Pedro Pou (1999), “Is Globalization Really To Blame?”, in Jane Sneddon Little and
Giovanni P. Olivei, eds., Rethinking the International Monetary System. Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 43.
31  See Stanley Fischer, (2001), “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring.- 25 -
a received wisdom that the so-called soft pegs are no longer workable for emerging market
countries integrated into international capital market. If such country wants to keep its own
currency, it has to allow it float, or to maintain the so-called hard, peg, that is, a CBA. A
CBA was assumed to be less vulnerable to speculative attacks that have wreaked havoc with
the standard exchange rate pegs. Argentina’s experience has now challenged that wisdom.
Initially, the introduction of CBA in 1991 has brought significant benefits to
Argentina. Before its introduction, the country was in the midst of a financial chaos and
hyperinflation, economic activity was falling rapidly and poverty was on the rise. With the
help of the CBA and the discipline it brought, the authorities were able to bring inflation
down rapidly. Rapid decline in inflation, in connection with the credibility of the law backed
CBA, resulted in a similarly rapid decline of interest rates close to international level.
32
Finally, restoration of financial stability after the introduction of the CBA was followed by a
rapid remonetization of the economy. Stabilization and remonetization have had an
immediate beneficial effect on Argentina’s economy. While average per capita real GDP
growth in the 1980s was –2.9 percent, in the 1990s, it was +3.2 percent.
However, from the long-term perspective, the verdict about the appropriateness of
the CBA in Argentina is more difficult. Two questions need to be answered. First, were the
conditions in place to ensure that even in the long-term, benefits of the CBA would continue
to exceed costs? And second, did the authorities have a strategy of exit from the CBA in case
that the costs of the CBA begin to exceed its benefits, or did they see it as a permanent
arrangement, regardless of how it operates?
In order for a CBA to bring sustainable benefits, certain conditions need to be met.
33
We can understand best this by looking at the implications of a CBA for the economy and
economic policy.
First, a CBA implies an introduction of nominal exchange rate rigidity. In this
connection, there are three risks. One is that the parity is initially set at the wrong exchange
                                               
32 The evidence suggest that CBA are more effective in bringing interest rates down than
different exchange rate arrangements, even if the rate of inflation falls similarly. See IMF
Staff Team (1997), Currency Board Arrangements: Issues and Experience. IMF Occasional
Paper 151.
33 Not everyone agrees that a country that wants to introduce a CBA needs to meet certain
preconditions. Steve Hanke, an enthusiastic promoter of CBAs, disagrees with such idea. He
thinks that currency board could be introduced by any country. See S. Hanke (2000), “The
Disregard for Currency Board Realities.” Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 49-59. In a sense,
he may be right. Indeed, a CBA could be introduced in any country, provided they have
enough reserves in the first place. But this does not mean that it would work well in any
country.- 26 -
rate, that the country locks itself into a too appreciated exchange rate. Second and related risk
is that inflation will not come down sufficiently quickly after the currency has been pegged
and that the currency would appreciate in real terms, undermining the competitiveness. Third
risk is that the domestic currency is pegged to a foreign currency that fluctuates significantly
against other currencies, thus exposing domestic currency to large fluctuation against these
currencies as well.
It is difficult to assess whether the Argentinean currency was pegged at the wrong
parity when the currency board was introduced.
34 After a period of hyperinflation and
financial instability, foreign exchange market did not operate properly and determining the
“correct” exchange rate was a difficult exercise.
As for the second risk, there has been a significant initial real appreciation of the peso
in 1990-1993, as inflation in Argentina remained above inflation of its trading partners.
35
Measured by the consumer price index, real effective exchange rate in 1993 has appreciated
by nearly 30 percent relative to 1991. But it declined quite sharply in the period to 1997.
Even more rapid was the decline in real effective exchange rate based on unit labor cost
(ULC), which obviously is a better measure of competitiveness than CPI-based real effective
exchange rate. Between 1993 and 1997, ULC-based real effective exchange rate depreciated
by nearly 40 percent. During that same period, the share of Argentina’s exports in world
exports has increased from about 0.35 percent to 0.5 percent. So there is little evidence of
competitiveness problem in that period.
Then in the period 1997-2000, both CPI-based and ULC-based real effective
exchange rates have appreciated, by about 20 percent and 10 percent respectively, while
Argentina’s terms of trade have deteriorated by about 15 percent in 1997-99. The share of
Argentina’s exports in world exports fell back to 0.35 percent in 2000. This already signals a
problem of competitiveness. But this real appreciation was not caused  by high domestic
inflation, but by the dollar’s appreciation against the currencies of Argentina’s trading
partners. The third risk of the currency peg was the most serious: Argentina’s peso was
pegged to a wrong currency. Argentina's exports to the United States are only a relatively
small share of total exports, about 10 percent, while large share of exports goes traditionally
to Europe. However, as the U.S. dollar appreciated against the euro at the end of the 1990s,
so did the Argentinean peso. But while strong dollar was justified by rapid U.S. growth and
                                               
34 Argentina established a fixed exchange rate of 10 000 australes (later 1 peso) for one US
dollar. It should be noted that at this exchange rate, international reserves were still not
sufficient to cover the notes and coins plus banks’ deposits at the central bank.
35 But the relatively high inflation in the first years of the CBA may have reflected a catch-up
of some domestic prices, which in dollar terms were too low when the fixed parity and peso
convertibility to dollars was established. This would be the case if the initial parity would be
somewhat depreciated relative to the purchasing power parity.- 27 -
large inflow of foreign capital attracted by high productivity growth, real appreciation was
less appropriate for Argentina which at that time suffered from negative terms of trade shock.
In the end, the government tried to loosen this unfortunate peg to a very strong currency, by
announcing the plan to move to a basket peg, but at that time, it was too late to save the
CBA.
36
Table 11 shows the growth of export and import volumes. Import volume picked up
strongly in early 1990s, but this was probably more a result of pent-up demand after the
liberalization of external trade) than a sign of overvalued currency. In the period 1994 to
1998, export volume growth was quite robust too, though it grew less than import volume. In
1999 and 2000, export growth practically stopped, while import volume began to fall. But
overall, the difference over cumulative growth of export and import volumes during the
1990s was very large and suggests a problem.
Table 11. Trade balance ($ bil), export volume and import volume (1990 = 100)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Export 97 99 104 122 153 163 188 206 204 208
Import 215 395 445 564 500 598 783 851 734 727
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Argentina Country Reports, 1996; IMF data.
Second consequence of the CBA is the loss of monetary control. Domestic interest
rates were determined to a large extent by monetary conditions and interest rates in the
country of reserve currency. But monetary conditions appropriate for the United States need
not suit well the needs of Argentina. Of course, the history of serious monetary
mismanagement when monetary policy was under the control of Argentina suggest that such
a loss of monetary control should not be necessary seen as a bad thing. But the loss of
monetary control did create its own problems, by limiting the authorities’ ability to respond
to asymmetric shocks. This problem became particularly acute in late 1990s. While the U.S.
economy was growing fast and tighter monetary policy was needed to prevent inflation from
getting out of control, Argentina’s economy was adversely affected by a sequence of external
shocks, economic growth fell, and more stimulative monetary policy stance would have been
normally appropriate.
Third, the introduction of the CBA implies partial or full loss of ability to provide
lender of last resort assistance to banking sector. As we have seen, during the Mexican crisis
                                               
36 In a more formal analysis, Hristov (2002) arrives at the conclusion that in the period till
1999, Argentinean real exchange rate was not fundamentally misaligned  relative to the
fundamental equilibrium exchange rate. See Kalin Hristov, (2002), “Fundamental
Equilibrium Exchange Rates and Currency Boards: Evidence from Argentina and Estonia in
the 90s.” Bulgarian National Bank Discussion Paper 22.- 28 -
in early 1995, there was large outflow of deposits from the banking system in Argentina and
the rules of the CBA have limited the ability of the central bank to provide liquidity
assistance to otherwise sound banks that were under liquidity pressure. By increasing the
coverage of reserve money by foreign exchange reserves and by demanding a large build-up
of reserves, Argentina's central bank has created some limited room for liquidity injection to
banking sector when the need arose. But this room for liquidity support was limited and had
to be enhanced by official financial assistance. Still, one can argue that Argentina's banking
sector was in a reasonably strong position and that it did not represent the main weakness of
the  CBA.
To conclude on the role of the CBA, it could be argued that initially, it has played a
crucial role in establishing price stability and economic growth. However, it has also
restrained the policymakers’ ability to respond to external shocks. The economy did not
strengthen enough to be able to withstand the sequence of serious shocks in the second half
of the 1990s without a serious damage to economic growth. Clearly, the balance of costs and
benefits of the CBA has been shifting over time: while the benefits of the CBA were front-
loaded and materialized mainly in early 1990s, the costs increased over time, as the economy
was hit by a sequence of serious external shocks to which it was unable to adjust sufficiently.
Escude and Powell (2001) were asking whether under some circumstances, for example,
under sufficiently severe and persistent shocks, the fixed exchange rate can actually prevent
the economy from getting out of recession and hence leaving it stuck in a state of depression.
For Argentina, the answer is obviously ‘yes’.
6.d. Structural reforms
When the crisis erupted at the end of 2001, many politicians and some analysts
argued that this is the result of implementation of the free market model to Argentina, which
was imposed by the United States and the IMF. It was alleged that the country was pursuing
a policy of rapid opening, liberalization and privatization that has produced increasing
dependence on foreign capital and increasing vulnerability to adverse external
developments.
37  According to the arguments, such model was unfit for an emerging market
country such as Argentina and Argentina’s crisis has shown that a new development model
need to be put in place.
                                               
37 For example, one of the most vociferous IMF critics Joseph Stiglitz, former chief
economist of the World Bank, has criticized the IMF for its support to the privatization of
Argentina’s banks to foreign owners (see Ekonom, No. 3, 2002 (published in Czech)). He
blamed foreign owned banks for their failure to lend to small and medium-sized domestic
firms, which contributed to Argentina’s economic problems. But Argentina’s banks before
their privatization in the early 1990s were anything but a symbol of financial strength and a
guarantor of economic prosperity, as frequent and costly banking crises testify. Restructuring
Argentina's banking system after the crisis in early 1980s cost 13 percent of annual GDP.- 29 -
But as some other analysts have reminded, Argentina in the 1990s was far from a
perfect model of flexible free market economy.
38 In countries that adopt a CBA, it is
important to ensure a sufficient degree of flexibility in the economy, particularly in labor
markets, to compensate for the loss of monetary and exchange rate flexibility and to be able
to adjust to external shocks. Indeed, after the introduction of the CBA, Argentina has made a
significant progress in structural reforms. First, the government undertook a complete
overhaul of the public sector system. Most public enterprises were privatized and the role of
the government in the economy was significantly curtailed. This was accompanied by
extensive deregulation and simplification of the tax system. The result was a rapid decline in
government expenditures as a share of GDP and reduction of budget deficit. Second,
extensive deregulation took place on the external front, including the elimination of capital
account restrictions and reduction in import tariffs. This has contributed to Argentina’s
increasing integration with the world economy and international capital market. Third,
progress was made in the banking sector reforms. Capital adequacy requirements were
tightened, undercapitalized institutions were closed, and public transparency increased.
Privatization of banks to foreigners has increased the confidence in the banking system.
But while impressive and possibly sufficient in a more quiet times, in the turbulent
second half of the 1990s, there reforms were not sufficient to provide the Argentinean
economy the needed flexibility to operate successfully under the CBA. From that
perspective, there was still not enough reform.
The biggest failure was the insufficient progress in improving the flexibility of the
labor market.
39 Argentina’s labor market was traditionally very inflexible and centralized
bargaining process continued to play an important role even in the 1990s. Labor market
flexibility was also hampered by high dismissal costs and high payroll taxes have kept labor
cost very high. These taxes added a mark-up of 60 percent to net wages. Another problem
was a downward wage rigidity which exacerbated the recession in the late 1990s. According
to Escude and Powell (2001), between 3Q1998 and 3Q1999, nominal GDP declined by 6.6
percent, but average real CPI deflated remuneration in the economy increased 3.8 percent.
Because flexible labor market is an important condition for a smooth operation of a
CBA, these features of Argentina’s labor market had costly consequences. They have
contributed to a large increase in unemployment in early 1990s. Unemployment remained
high despite rapid economic growth, because high labor cost encouraged firms to substitute
                                               
38  For an interesting account of Argentina’s structural and institutional shortcomings see
Brink Lindsey, “How Argentina Got Into This Mess”, The Wall Street Journal, January 9,
2002.
39  See Corrola Pessino, Argentina: The Labor Market During the Economic Transition. In S.
Edwards and N.C. Lustig, eds., (1997) Labor Markets in Latin America: Combining Social
Protection With Market Flexibility. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.- 30 -
capital for labor. And while unemployment was rising, a large part of unemployed did not
receive a sufficient social support.
High wage cost and low downward flexibility of wages were undermining the
competitiveness of Argentina’s exporters. It has been shown that a substantial part of
Argentina’s exports is highly sensitive to unit labor costs, and that high labor taxes and labor
market rigidities have adversely affected export performance and contributed to the widening
trade deficit in the 1990s.
40
We can conclude that the constraints on labor market flexibility, together with the
insufficiently progress in strengthening public finance, limited Argentina’s scope to respond
to negative external shocks and mitigate their effect on economic activity. Ultimately, this
led to the undermining of confidence in the sustainability of the CBA.
7. Argentina crisis and the IMF
After the heavy criticism that the IMF has received for its handling of financial crises
in Asia and elsewhere, it came as no surprise that many commentators and analysts put
quickly blame for what has happened in Argentina at the IMF’s door. The IMF was criticized
for several reasons. Some have blamed the IMF that together with the United States, it has
supported the introduction of neoliberal economic model to Argentina that has led to the
crisis later on.
 It is difficult to argue with this more ideological than economic argument and
we will leave them aside. Another group of critics has accused the IMF that it has triggered
the crisis by stopping to provide financial assistance in December 2001. And as has become
lately typical, others have criticized the IMF for exactly the opposite mistake, namely that it
has continued to lend to Argentina for too long, thereby making the crisis more serious
because it allowed the authorities to postpone the necessary change in the policy regime. This
is the most serious criticism that deserves attention. We will not attempt to prove the
innocence of the IMF regarding this accusation. What we will attempt to do is to lay out the
consideration which the IMF had to take into account when making decisions whether to
continue providing financial assistance or whether to pronounce the program off track.
In the course of the 1990s, the IMF was intensively involved in Argentina and during
most of that period, IMF program was in place.
41 Table 12 provides the overview of IMF
lending to Argentina. As we can see, for most of the decade, Argentina was under the care of
the IMF programs, and it has drawn about SDR 15 billion from the IMF during that period.
To put it in perspective, Argentina’s current quota in the IMF is SDR 2117.1 million.
                                               
40 See Luis Catão and Elisabetta Falcetti (1999), “Determinants of Argentina’s External
Trade.” IMF Working Paper 99/121.
41 As Mussa (2002) notes, the fact that the IMF was intensively involved in Argentina, more
than in Asian countries affected by a crisis,  raises the question why this more intense form of
involvement did not prevent the economy’s collapse.- 31 -
Table 12. IMF lending to Argentina (in SDR mil)
Date of Approval Amount approved Amount drawn
Stand-by 7/29/91     780.00   438.75
Extended arrangement 3/31/92   4020.25 4020.25
Stand-by 4/12/96     720.00   613.00
Extended arrangement 02/04/98   2080.00        0.0
Stand-by  03/10/00






1/ Resources provided under the supplementary reserve facility (SRF) have a shorter
repayment period and escalating charges (interest rate) depending on the size and length of
the use. The amount shown here includes two augmentations of the original arrangement
approved in January and August 2001.
  The first and second arrangements in 1991 and 1992 were approved mainly to support
the program of economic stabilization and structural reforms in connection with the
introduction of the Convertibility Law and the CBA. The third arrangement in 1996 was
approved to help Argentina to overcome the problems related to the Mexican crisis. The
extended arrangement approved in 1998 was to serve as a policy framework for a further
fiscal consolidation and completion of structural reforms. At that time, Argentina enjoyed
good access to international capital markets and it decided to treat the arrangement as
precautionary. However, good times sometimes do not encourage good policy management.
In 1999, this program went off track, as the authorities missed several targets agreed under
the arrangement, particularly regarding fiscal policy. Deficits of federal and provincial
governments were higher than agreed under the program.
In December 1999, new government took office and agreed with the IMF a new
adjustment program that was supported by the stand-by arrangement approved in March
2000. Again, the authorities indicated that they want to treat the arrangement as
precautionary, because they wanted to continue relying on market financing. The main
purpose of the arrangement was to protect Argentina against the volatile market conditions
and potential loss of market access. But it was assumed that the very existence of this safety
cushion in the form of the IMF financing would ensure that Argentina’s access to
international capital market would remain good and that the IMF money will not be needed.
As we have already discussed, Argentina’s access to international capital market did not
improve, even after it borrowed more than SDR 10 billion from the IMF and the program
was not completed.
In the course of the 2001, many analysts and economists were pointing to the
increasingly unsustainable situation in Argentina. They did not see how a shrinking economy
and shrinking budget revenues could allow the government to continue servicing its debt, and
how the convertibility could be maintained in the face of this apparently inevitable- 32 -
government default. Well-respected economists have criticized the IMF decision to provide
more money and support the insupportable and called for the abandonment of the CBA.
For example, in June, Michael Bordo and Roberto Chang from Rutgers University
argued that on its tenth anniversary, the time has come to abandon the CBA and to replace it
with a floating exchange rate and credible inflation targeting.
42 Barry Eichengreen,
economist with a very good knowledge of the IMF, noted immediately after the
announcement of the new agreement with the IMF in early September that social unrest in
Argentina is on the rise and that zero-deficit rule will make things only worse, because it
would put even more deflationary pressures on the already weak economy, cause further fall
in tax revenues and thus require even more tax cuts to keep the deficit target.
43 Eichengreen
mentioned that an alternative solution would be the so-called “Quadruple-D” strategy,
namely devaluation, dollarization, deposit write-down and debt restructuring.
At the end of October, former chief economist of the Inter-American Development
Bank Ricardo Hausmann suggested that Argentina should abandon the existing policy
strategy, de-dollarize the economy, move to a floating exchange rate regime and introduce
strict inflation targets as new nominal anchor to the economy.
44 And soon thereafter, the
former chief economist of the IMF Michael Mussa argued that the IMF decision to extend
financial assistance in September was a big mistake and that the international effort to help
Argentina has failed. He argued that even with substantial international financial assistance,
Argentina cannot service fully its debt obligations to private creditors, which need to be
rescheduled. And he too agreed with Hausmann that the CBA is no longer sustainable and
that it has to be abandoned, while at the same time dollar assets and liabilities will need to be
redenominated into domestic currency.
45
Why, despite all this opposition of well-respected international economists did
Argentina continue to support the CBA and peso convertibility, and why its political
representatives continued to insist till the very last moment that Argentina would honor all
external debt obligations? And why did the IMF continue to provide financing as late as in
early September 2001, when few outside Argentina’s government believed that the program
could work and that Argentina could maintain its policy framework? Answers to these two
questions are closely related.
                                               
42  Financial Times, June 6, 2001.
43 See Barry Eichengreen (2001), “Argentina After the IMF,” mimeo, which could be found
on http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr.
44 See Financial Times, October 29, 2001.
45 See Financial Times, November 9, 2001. Mussa subsequently elaborated on this criticism
in his later paper, see Mussa (2002).- 33 -
There are two basic reasons why Argentina has stuck so desperately to the CBA, and
why it tried to avoid defaulting on its debt at any cost. First part of the answer is to be sought
in Argentina’s history of hyperinflation, financial crises and debt defaults. Convertibility
Plan and the introduction of the CBA in 1991 were supposed to be a decisive and definitive
break with the past. Argentina was supposed to become a stable and prosperous modern
economy, which enjoys respectability in international markets, which honors its
commitments (both vis-à-vis its citizens, by maintaining the convertibility of peso to dollar at
the fixed parity, and vis-à-vis the international investors, by honoring its debt). The
authorities understood well that breaking these promises yet again would be very costly, that
Argentina would loose access to international markets, possibly for a long time and that it
would hardly be able to enjoy a stable domestic currency and well-developed domestic
financial market.
Second, ten years of the CBA and convertibility have made Argentina very
vulnerable to exchange rate devaluation. During the Asian crisis, it became clear how
governments’ commitment to maintain stable nominal exchange rates could encourage banks
and firms to borrow in foreign currencies. The result was large open foreign exchange
position, or currency mismatch in banks’ and firms’ balance sheets. If a bank or a firm has
more dollar liabilities than assets, devaluation of domestic currency could impose a serious
damage to its balance sheet and could even lead to a negative net worth and bankruptcy. Of
course, if this happens on an economy-wide scale, financial distress could become very
widespread and even banks and firms whose balance sheets are not vulnerable to currency
depreciation could be hurt because of financial problems of their debtors, customers or
suppliers. Asian crisis has demonstrated how a fixed exchange rate regime encourages banks
and firms to build-up such open foreign exchange positions and how devastating could
subsequent devaluation of domestic currency be. However, CBAs were supposed to be
immune against this risk, because unlike soft pegs, they were not supposed to succumb to
speculative attacks or be abandoned in the midst of a crisis. They were supposed to last. In
Argentina, this strong institutional and legal underpinning of the CBA has encouraged even
more dollarization of the economy, it contributed to a build-up of open position and currency
mismatches. Banks’ currency mismatch did not appear to be significant (see table 13), but
situation could be more difficult in nonfinancial sector, as would be suggested by the low
degree of openness of the economy and thus limited scope for natural hedge of dollar
liabilities by export revenues. Government was not too much concerned about contracting
dollar-denominated debt either, even though it knew that it would have to finance future
dollar debt service from its peso revenues. Companies were not worried about taking dollar
loans, even though they knew that their revenues are mainly in pesos (except some utilities
whose tariffs were dollar-indexed).
46 This is the paradox. The very credibility of the CBA
                                               
46  As Morris Goldstein observes, “the same constraints that make currency boards more
‘permanent’ than soft pegs also make it more costly for a country to exit a currency board if
and when it decides to do so. The higher the costs of reneging on the exchange rate
commitment, the longer the country may delay needed correction action to bring the real
(continued)- 34 -
made its abandonment more costly and thus less attractive option that was postponed as long
as possible.
Table 13. Banking system: currency composition of loans and deposits (bil peso)
Credit to public sector Credit to private sector Private sector deposits
Peso 3.2 19.3 22.9
Dollar 26.5 37.7 46.7
Source: Credit data are for November 2001, Banco Central de la República
Argentina, http://www.bcra.gov.ar/estadistica/estad000100.asp . For private sector deposit,
IMF estimates for 2001.
But there was more than just the concern about the adverse effect of exit from the
CBA and devaluation on banks’ and firms’ balance sheets. The government knew that peso
devaluation would also lead to its own default on public debt, because the peso value of
dollar public debt would increase commensurately to the extent of devaluation. Argentina
was among the largest emerging market borrowers (Argentina’s share in the Emerging
Market Bond Index was about 25 percent) and default would result in loss of access to
international markets, possibly for a long time. It was very difficult, if not impossible, to
separate the exit from the CBA and the default on external debt. These two problems were
intimately connected. The authorities (and for that matter, the IMF) were concerned that debt
default of such a large borrower would be a very messy event, costly to Argentina, but also to
other emerging market countries (this latter worried perhaps more the IMF than the
Argentineans).
47
Finally, there was the political dimension of the whole problem. The CBA was not
just one of the possible exchange rate regimes. To Argentineans, it was an important symbol
of political and financial stability. And its founding father, Domingo Cavallo, staked its
                                                                                                                                                 
exchange rate into line, and the larger could be the size of devaluation when it occurs.” See
M. Goldstein (2002), “Managed Floating Plus and the Great Currency Regime Debate”. IMF
Institute Economics Training Program.
47 The experience of Argentina has demonstrated the potentially high costs of  absence of an
orderly framework for sovereign debt restructuring that would provide creditors and debtors
an incentive to start discussing debt restructuring before the situation reaches a crisis stage.
This costly experience may have provided the needed impetus to develop and introduce such
framework. See Anne Krueger, “A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,”
Address at the National Economists' Club Annual Members' Dinner,  American Enterprise
Institute, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm ) for an outline of how
such framework should look like and what it should accomplish.- 35 -
political carrier on its success. Abandoning the CBA would not be just an economic decision,
but also a decision with important political aspect. While economically, it would make sense
to exit the currency board sooner rather than later, before the crisis gathers strength, political
costs of such exit were likely be very high in any case. At the end of 2001, Argentina was
already undergoing a third year of economic recession, the population was paying a heavy
economic costs for the sake of maintaining the CBA and confidence of international
investors, for the sake of avoiding default. It would take a great political courage to say that
these three years of sacrifice and suffering were futile and that the regime has to be scratched
anyway. If there was even a small chance that the CBA could be preserved and default
avoided, it was in the interest of the politicians to try to preserve it, even if they needed to
resort to innovative policy measures, or to request ever higher official financial assistance.
From their perspective, this was a rational strategy, similar to a strategy of a bankrupt bank
gambling for a survival. If by chance this strategy were to succeed and the existing policy
framework preserved, they would win; if not, they would bear the costs regardless.
What about the IMF? What consideration was it facing when it was deciding whether
or not to go ahead with the new loans?
48 The original approval of the stand-by arrangement
in March 2000 was not much of a problem. As we have noted, the arrangement was initially
treated as precautionary, intended just to protect Argentina from a possible deterioration of
external conditions. Argentina’s policies and the CBA were not seen as a problem. In early
2001, when external conditions deteriorated and Argentina began to actually draw the IMF
money, there was still reason to believe that the problem is mainly external and that a solid
program could restore investors’ confidence and growth. Even in the May 2001 IMF World
Economic Outlook, it was noted that Argentina’s difficult situation is related to previous
increase in international interest rates, deterioration in terms of trade, and effect of the
Brazil’s devaluation. However, in 2001, the Fed began to reduce rapidly U.S. interest rates,
but this reduction failed to help Argentina. In summer 2001, it became ever more clear that
the strategy of large official financial support does not work and that Argentina is doing
much worse than other emerging markets. The problem was mainly domestic, not adverse
external conditions. At that time, the IMF faced a difficult choice: to tell the Argentineans
that the new policy strategy of zero deficit they put in place during the summer does not have
a chance and does not deserve continued IMF financial support, or to conclude that it is a
risky strategy, but still worth supporting. This was a tough call. It is one thing when a
respected academician writes in the newspaper that a country should abandon the CBA and
default on its external debt. It is a completely different thing when the IMF refuses to provide
more money to a country and thus actually precipitates the collapse of the CBA and default
on external debt. The IMF decided to give the authorities and the CBA one last chance.
                                               
48 When speaking about the IMF decisions, we need to keep in mind the relatively
complicated structure of IMF decision making, which includes the management, the
Executive Board and of course the political authorities of the shareholders.- 36 -
With the benefit of hindsight, this choice now may appear as wrong and even
irresponsible. The IMF is now being accused that by continuing to finance Argentina, it has
allowed to postpone the crisis and thus made it more serious. But what would happen if in
August or September 2001, the IMF would decide to stop the financing? Most likely, it
would be accused that it caused the collapse of the CBA and that it forced the country to
default. And it would not be just the analysts who would be making such accusation, but the
Argentinean government as well.
49 They would probably have argued that they were ready to
implement all the policies necessary to restore confidence and preserve the convertibility and
that if the IMF would have continued its financial support, this strategy would have worked.
And there would be no counterfactual to prove them wrong. In fact, similar criticism could
be seen even after the decision in early December not to complete the fourth review under the
stand-by arrangement, and thus stop disbursing new loans. Some officials and bankers argued
that the interruption has prevented the completion of a large voluntary debt swap with foreign
creditors that would have (finally!) achieved the elusive goal of restoring market confidence.
So inevitably, the IMF was between the rock and the hard place, and there was no way how
to get out of this situation without providing ammunition to one or other group of critics. No




More important than to decide who is to blame for Argentina’s crisis is to put the
pieces together and get the economy working again. Policymakers in Argentina face two
difficult tasks. In the short-term, they had to deal with the immediate consequences of the
crisis. In the medium- and long-term, they have to make the country less vulnerable to
adverse shocks.
Unfortunately, in the first months after the crisis has erupted, the authorities were
unable to put together a coherent economic strategy that would allow to resolve the crisis.
After abandoning the fixed exchange rate, monetary policy has been lacking a credible
anchor that would help keeping inflation expectations under control. Despite the depressed
state of the economy, inflation began to pick up. In the period January-April 2002, consumer
prices increased by 21 percent, and producer prices by 61 percent. There was some confusion
                                               
49 There is some indication that such accusation would be made. As Paul Krugman notes,
Domingo Cavallo was blaming the quoted articles by Mussa and Hausmann for precipitating
the crisis. See P. Krugman, Argentina’s Money Monomania,
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/%7Epkrugman/mania.html.
50 For a good analysis of this dilemma and the politics behind the policy choices in late 2001
see Steven Pearlstein, “For IMF, Argentina Was an Unsolvable Puzzle,” The Washington
Post, January 3, 2002, p. E1.- 37 -
what exchange rate regime to put in place instead of the CBA. The authorities first
introduced a dual exchange rate: a fixed exchange rate of 1.4 peso per dollar for official
transaction, mainly for exports and imports and debt service, and floating exchange rate for
other transactions. Subsequently, the dual exchange rate was abandoned and the authorities
allowed to currency float. By early June 2002, it fell below 3.6 peso per dollar, loosing more
than two thirds of its value.
51
Equally lacking has been a credible strategy to address the fiscal problems. To some
extent, this reflects the complicated social and political situation that is not conducive to
making the needed difficult political decisions.  On February 3, the Government unveiled a
new economic package which included a fairly restrictive 2002 budget. The draft budget
assumed a 2.7 billion peso deficit (which equaled $1.93 billion at the official exchange rate
1.4 peso per dollar in place at that time, compared to $11 billion deficit in 2001). However,
the assumptions in the budget - real GDP contraction of 5 percent, inflation 14.1 yoy at the
end of 2002, and exchange rate 1.4 peso per dollar - became quickly obsolete. The IMF now
expects that real GDP will decline by 12-15 percent, and inflation could exceed 60 percent or
more. In February, the government has also signed a pact with the provinces that committed
them to reduce their 2002 deficits by 60 percent, but in view of the deteriorating economic
situation, it is not clear whether there will be a political will necessary to live up to this
commitment, and by the end of May, negotiations still continued. Provinces are issuing in
increasing amount their own “money”, which together with the central bank financing of
government, liquidity support to banks, and rapidly depreciating currency risks further rapid
acceleration of inflation.
52
Situation in the banking sector is similarly difficult, and requires a rapid and
comprehensive resolution. Pesoization of bank’s assets at the 1 peso per one dollar and
bank’s liabilities at the 1.4 peso per dollar has produced large losses for banks and increased
future government liability. Negative effect on banks’ balance sheets of this asymmetric
conversion is estimated in the amount of 15-20 billion peso. To prevent a complete collapse
of the banking system, a large part of deposits was frozen. However, this came at the cost of
further depressing the economy and alienating the depositors.
                                               
51 In order to prevent an even sharper decline, the central bank was intervening in the foreign
exchange market, while politicians were from time to time speaking about the possibility of
re-pegging the peso, further adding to the perception of lack of coherent policy strategy.
52 Market analysts note that so far, wage growth has not yet accelerated in response to rising
prices and that given the depressed state of the economy, the pass-though of currency
depreciation into domestic prices was so far limited. If wage growth accelerates and the pass-
through increases, the risk that inflation will get out of control would increase dramatically.
See J.P. Morgan (2002), Global Data Watch, May 10.- 38 -
The lack of credible economic strategy has delayed the conclusion of agreement with
the IMF on a new program. In turn, failure to reach an agreement with the IMF has delayed
the start of negotiations with foreign creditors on debt rescheduling. It is not surprising that
under these circumstances, already low market market confidence continued to weaken in
2002.
Addressing the banking crisis and restoring the operation of the banking system is
presently the most urgent task. Argentina’s banks are de facto not operating: deposits are to a
large extent frozen, new lending stopped and thus further depressed economic activity. In
order to get the economy moving again, deposits need to be unfrozen and banks need to
resume lending. But to unfreeze deposits without a new round of bank run, and to maintain at
least a limited depositors’ confidence in banks’ solvency will not be easy. The resolution of
banking crisis was made more difficult by Supreme Courts’ ruling that the deposit freeze is
unconstitutional. The authorities need to announce a comprehensive strategy how to restore
confidence in banks, including a framework for the resolution of insolvent banks and
recapitalization of  banks that are deemed viable.
 Resolution of banking sector will have important fiscal implications and must
therefore be a part of the plan of fiscal consolidation and restructuring of public debt. While
bank crisis resolution will need to address the issue of distribution of losses among
depositors, creditors and owners, restructuring of the public debt is mainly about the
distribution of the losses between the foreign creditors and domestic population. Nouriel
Roubini (2001) makes a case that foreign creditors should receive a bigger haircut in debt
restructuring than domestic creditors, because domestic population is already carrying a large
part of the cost of crisis as a result of increasing unemployment and falling incomes.
53 On
first sight, this looks like a sensible argument. But it is not watertight. Foreign debt holders
are supposed to receive a fixed interest payment for their investment. Normally, they are not
supposed to carry the upside or downside risk of economy’s performance. If the economy is
doing better than expected, they do not receive additional payments for their loans. Similarly,
if the economy is doing worse than expected, they are not supposed to receive less payments.
Of course, if the sovereign is unable to fully service its debt and debt reduction is required,
foreign creditors must share the haircut with domestic creditors  and the other stakeholders.
But purely on economic grounds, there is no compelling argument why foreign investors in
Argentina’s sovereign debt should be forced to accept a larger haircut that, for example, a
domestic public sector employee (in terms of his/her salary reduction). Domestic
stakeholders in the economy share the upside risk and should thus share the downside risk as
well (one can see a parallel with  the risk-return profile of bond holders and equity holders in
a company).
54 But in practice, the burden sharing is not always based purely on economic
                                               
53  See N. Roubini (2001), “Why Should the Foreign Creditors of Argentina Take a Greater
Hit/Haircut Than the Domestic Ones,”  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/ .
54 Of course, the problem arises when this sharing of the upside and downside risk is not
symmetrical across the population.- 39 -
considerations. Unlike the Argentinean public sector employee, the foreign investor cannot
bang the pots and march in the streets of Buenos Aires to force a better deal on the
government. Political consideration impose limits on the extent to which the allocation of
losses could be based on purely economic considerations.
The losses resulting from the crisis that will need to be allocated will be larger and the
task of their allocation more difficult and potentially more disorderly, the larger will be the
depreciation of the domestic currency. In the worst-case scenario, Argentina could slip again
into the vicious circle of depreciation and high inflation – a risk that becomes more real every
day. To prevent such scenario from materializing, a new credible monetary policy framework
needs to be put in place. For a country abandoning the CBA, there are two basic options:
either to dollarize, or to move to a floating exchange rate regime.
Given Argentina's history of mismanagement of its currency, there would seem to be
a strong case for dollarization, which would remove the possibility of monetary
mismanagement once and for all.
55 But dollarization would suffer from the same problem as
the CBA: if the dollar appreciates against other currencies and if domestic costs in Argentina
do not adjust sufficiently flexibly, as seemed to have been the case thus far, it could
undermine the competitiveness of Argentina's exporters in other than dollar markets. Another
potentially attractive feature of dollarization would be the avoidance of damaging effects of
large currency depreciation on banks’, firms’, and households’ balance sheets. But this
advantage of dollarization is more apparent than real.
56 To correct the peso overvaluation,
dollarization would have to take place under a devalued exchange rate anyway, producing the
same adverse balance sheet effect (though arguably less serious compared to the possible
overshooting in the regime of a free float). And if dollarization would take place without the
initial devaluation, so as to avoid its undesirable balance sheet effect, the economy would
have to adjust to the introduction of a very strong currency by cost-cutting and a period of
deflation, which would likely be a very protracted process, imposing different hardship on
the economy by increasing the real value of debts.
For these reasons, the consensus seem to be today that a free float is a better choice
for Argentina, at least for the time being. But introducing a float to a country which has a
long history of high inflation, whose central bank has little if any credibility and which is in a
deep crisis will be a very difficult task. Even if the central bank and the government do
                                               
55 For example, see Jeffrey Sachs, “Duhalde’s Wrong Turn”, Financial Times, January 11,
2002.
56 See Nouriel Roubini, (2001), “Should Argentina Dollarize or Float? The Pros and Cons of
Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes and their Implications for Domestic and Foreing Debt
Restructuring/Reduction”.  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/ .- 40 -
everything right, restoring the confidence in domestic currency will take time. The central
bank has to put in place soon a new monetary policy framework, most likely a standard
inflation targeting regime that works well in many other emerging market economies,
including the neighboring Brazil. But whether or not inflation targeting could work well in
Argentina  will depend less on technical sophistication of inflation modeling and inflation
forecasting and more on the ability of the government to abstain from misusing the central
bank as a source of financing budget deficits. The absence of fiscal dominance of monetary
policy will be a crucial precondition for success of this new monetary policy framework.
Under the current economic and political circumstances, avoiding the fiscal
dominance of monetary policy will be extremely difficult. Spending pressures are likely to be
high. The prolonged period of fiscal austerity has reduced both the willingness and the ability
of the population to accept further cuts in public spending, while recapitalizing the banking
system would require government financial assistance. Economic activity has plummeted
dramatically in last months of 2001 and in early 2002 and so did government revenues. In the
first quarter of 2002, tax revenues were by about 20 percent lower than a year ago. The
public sector financing gap has risen sharply, at the same time when the government has been
de facto shut from both domestic and international markets. Given the suspension of external
debt service, there is no prospect of being able to regain access to international markets
anytime soon. The situation is not much better at home. Domestic banks and pension funds
are already large holders of government debt and they will carry part of the cost of sovereign
default. Conceivably, the government can force them to accept more haircuts on their
holdings of public debt and even to buy new public debt, but this would likely only increase
the fiscal costs of bank restructuring and thus would not provide much new net financing to
the government. Households too are unlikely to use their savings (or whatever will be left of
them) to buy new government debt. So the only remaining choices are using money printing,
with the obvious risk of triggering inflation, or to adjust spending to available revenues. This
latter alternative may not be as unfeasible as it looks, for two reasons. First, debt default and
restructuring will provide a significant debt service relief to the government during the time
before it reaches the agreement with the creditors and resumes debt service.
57 Second, the
IMF and other multilateral and possibly bilateral official creditors could provide a temporary
financial assistance that could be partly used to help meet public sector borrowing needs
before the economy and government revenues recover.
Any exceptional official financial assistance will provide only a temporal relief to
Argentina. The most that the IMF and other official creditors could offer is to provide the
                                               
57 It may appear attractive to delay the resumption of debt service as long as possible, in
order to maximize the debt service relief in the present difficult times. However, such
strategy need not be optimal from the medium and long-term perspective. The speed of debt
restructuring agreement and its perceived fairness by Argentina's creditors will determine
how fast will Argentina able to return to international markets. The speed of this return will
also depend crucially on economic policies pursued in the future.- 41 -
government a breathing space that would allow to formulate a long-term policy strategy,
while avoiding in the meantime an acceleration of inflation and further social chaos that
would be difficult to reverse.
From the longer-term perspective, Argentina will have to address its main structural
problems, including its chronical dependence on external financing and its relatively closed
economy.
As we have argued, insufficient progress in strengthening financial discipline of
public sector has been an important contributing factor to Argentina’s crisis. Therefore, a
new fiscal policy framework will have to be put in place that would ensure a more
responsible conduct of fiscal policy, both at the central level and at the provincial level.
Public sector will have to learn to live within its means, without relying permanently on
borrowing. Some other countries, including Brazil, have successfully introduced a balanced
budget frameworks, whereby both central and local governments are required by law to
maintain balanced budgets, with exceptions to that rule clearly defined. Argentina will have
to reform its public finance framework in a similar spirit. The financial responsibility of the
provinces will have to be strengthened and better symmetry between their revenues and
spending responsibilities will need to be introduced.
Another difficult task will be to promote domestic savings. With lost access to
international capital market, Argentina will have to become less reliant on external savings
and it will need to rely more on domestic savings to finance domestic investment. Increased
domestic savings should also help mitigate the boom and bust cycles caused by fluctuations
in the availability of foreign capital (though after the latest big bust, the next boom may be
long in coming). Increased fiscal discipline of the public sector should contribute importantly
to increased domestic savings. Domestic financial stability too could be an important factor
supporting domestic savings. For some time, the stability of the domestic currency under the
floating exchange rate regime will remain untested and doubted. It would earn credibility
only gradually and only if the new monetary policy framework brings price stability and if
significant improvement in public sector finance takes place, removing thus the most serious
threat to price stability.
58 Domestic savings will be also affected by the way in which the
banking problems will be resolved. How much losses will be imposed on the depositors will
affect their future willingness to put their savings again in the banks. And the treatment of
foreign owners of Argentinean banks will determine whether they will be willing to continue
the operation in the country, or whether they will close the business and withdraw. Exit of
foreign banks from Argentina would likely represent a serious blow to the economy, as
confidence in banking sector would fall even more.
                                               
58 The experience under the CBA in the 1990s suggests that restoring confidence in
Argentina’s currency could be very difficult. But experience of some emerging market
countries with floating exchange rates suggests that this is not an impossible task.- 42 -
Equally difficult long-term task will be to make the Argentinean economy more open.
In contrast to the objective of improving fiscal discipline, there is no obvious answer to the
question how to make the economy quickly more open. Somewhat depreciated, but stable
currency should help. It should encourage not only Argentinean exports, but also investment
in the sector of tradable goods and thus a better diversification of Argentina’s exports so that
export revenues would be less sensitive to movements in commodity prices. A somewhat
controversial issue is how to deal with the Mercosur customs union, which does not seem to
have assisted much to trade openness of its members.
59  There has been some controversy
whether Mercosur has been trade-creating or trade-diverting.
60 More encouragement to
foreign direct investment in Argentina could help as well. Argentina needs to change the
structure of its economy, its dependence on exports of agriculture products and commodities
(in 2000, nearly 40 percent of its exports consisted of primary products and petroleum
products) and foreign investment would help in that effort. But clearly, there is no quick fix.
 Ultimately, the policy framework based on a floating exchange rate regime and fiscal
discipline may not be working and Argentina may need to dollarize the economy.
61 But
despite its problems, the strategy based on a floating exchange rate, stability-oriented
monetary policy and responsible fiscal policy seem to be momentarily the least bad and
deserves a chance. It is always possible to move from the floating exchange rate regime to
dollarization should the former framework not work well. But it would be practically
impossible to move to dollarization first, and then eventually try to de-dollarize and move to
a float if dollarization did not work.
No matter what policy strategy will be ultimately chosen to resolve the crisis, one
thing is clear. Resolution of the crisis will be a difficult and politically sensitive task and
before it could be successfully handled, it needs to be recognized how serious the crisis is
and what sacrifice it will require.  The country will have to learn to live within its means.
                                               
59 For example, in Financial Times, January 4, Ricardo Hausmann argues that Argentina
should move quickly toward the regional economic cooperation zone Mercosur. But in the
Wall Street Journal, January 25, the same author criticizes the new Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ruckauf for his goal “to strengthen the ties with Brazil and the protectionist customs
union Mercosur.”
60 Some would argue that Argentinean exports were hurt by large import tariffs and other
restrictions imposed by other countries, particularly in Europe, on Argentinean agriculture
products. While the reduction of such restrictions would certianly be desirable, Argentina
should have higher aspiration than just increase exports of agricultural products.
61 It should be noted that even in the present difficult times of a deep crisis, there is no
political consensus on how to proceed. Former president Menem continues to favor strongly
dollarization and he is unlikely to support enthusiastically the government’s effort to make
the float work.- 43 -
This will require a tighter constraint on spending. As Chairman Greenspan said in one of his
speeches, “no nation deliberately seeks to expose itself to financial stress and bankruptcy.
But political pressures often become difficult to deal with. To close the gap between the
financial demands of political constituencies and the limited real resources available to their
governments, many countries too often have bridged the difference by borrowing from
foreign creditors. In effect, the path of least resistance has been external borrowing rather
than confronting politically difficult tradeoffs.”
62 Argentina will have to confront these
difficult tradeoffs head on. The alternative to an orderly adjustment of spending to real
resources available through a political process is a disorderly adjustment through
hyperinflation. And this is an alternative that would leave everyone in Argentina worse off.
                                               
62 Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan on Globalization at the Institute for International
Economics’ Inauguration of the Peter G. Peterson Building, Washington, D.C., October 24,
2001, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20011024/default.htm.2008
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